How Logistics Evolved To Help Win WW II In The Central Pacific
One of the topics I want to cover in my book is why USS Franklin, (known as “Big Ben,” by her crew) was off the coast of Japan in March 1945. Call it, “putting her in the big picture,” if you will. That March, Task Force 58, of which Big Ben was a part, consisted of 16 carriers and about a hundred other ships ranging from battleships to destroyers. Logistics played a crucial role in enabling a fleet of that size to remain on station for days off a hostile coast as it flew hundreds of sorties
I was quite pleased when I found an article in the Journal of Military History, From Mobile Fleet To Mobile Force: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Logistics in the Central Pacific during World War II, by historian Trent Hone. The article encapsulated the importance of logistics in a nutshell. (Well, a 36-page nutshell, but still.)
Here are two things I learned from reading the article.
The Logistical Doctrine In Place in 1942 Was Unworkable
When the war began, the US Navy and the US Army had totally different logistical models and needs. Neither branch had a process that could ensure prompt replenishment of men and materiel.
The Navy’s War Plan Orange called for a base to be established in the western Pacific to supply the fleet in a war against Japan. Leyte, in the Philippines, was ruled out for strategic reasons. The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty forbade the building of bases in the Western Pacific such as Guam.1
The navy responded with “the advanced base concept.” This would establish a forward base as the navy advanced across the Pacific after the outbreak of war.2
As plans evolved during the 1930’s it became apparent to many that an advanced base might be vulnerable to enemy attack. Therefore, attention turned to the Central Pacific, but limited funding and over-optimistic planning crippled the development of an effective logistical doctrine.
When war broke out, the Navy confined itself to raiding Japanese bases. It wasn’t until Guadalcanal was invaded nine months after Pearl Harbor’s attack, that the first major territory was seized. Richard Frank wrote in Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, the Army, and the Navy often sent ships to the same ports without any coordination. 3 The initial months after the landing saw severe shortages of materiel. Admiral Bill Halsey, with the support of Admiral Chester Nimitz, was able to coordinate supply efforts with the US Army to alleviate the problems. When most people think of Guadalcanal, they credit the bravery of the US Marines, and they are right. But if the logistics situation hadn’t drastically improved, the Marines wouldn’t have had the food, ammunition, and other vital supplies to win. Hone writes that
To a significant extent, Guadalcanal became a battle of logistics. The side that was able to keep its forces supplied, fed, and fighting would triumph.4
The US Army and US Navy Solved Logistics Problems Together
The ability of the Army and the Navy to work together under the command of Admiral Nimitz was crucial. Also key was Nimitz’s willingness to let his subordinates try out new ideas. Admiral Halsey did this when he took over command of the South Pacific operations. Halsey reorganized the logistical effort putting Army Brigadier General Raymond Williamson in charge of the port of Noumea. The General increased the tonnage unloaded from 50,000 in November 1942 to 210,000 in January.5
The Navy’s logistical strategy evolved from being requisition-based to anticipating the needs of the fleet and its bases. This “flow-based system” decreased the amount of turnaround time for ships and greatly decreased port congestion.6
Beginning in 1943, the Navy established service squadrons that would eventually be able to replenish ships at sea. These squadrons allowed them to stay in the war zone much longer.
Contrast this with the Southwest Pacific Area under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. There the doctrine was top-down using centralized planning. This was much less efficient than the way Admiral Nimitz ran logistics resulting in poor coordination which led to delays and other inefficiencies.7
The Burton Method
While researching logistics, I came across an online article in the June 2018 Naval History Magazine. It stated that in 1944 Admiral Raymond Spruance began to plan the bombing of the Japanese Home Islands. This was to reduce the air and sea threat as landings were made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Up until that time, Task Force 58 would expend its ordinance in three days, then return to Ulitihi to replenish. This was a 12-day round trip meaning the task force could only be on station for three days. Captain Burton Briggs took on the task of creating a process to replenish ordnance at sea. In February of 1945, USS Bennington (CV-20) was the first beneficiary of the method.
By the time of the March mission, an ammunition ship sailed along with the task force’s oilers. These ships held station out of the range of the Japanese aircraft. When the task force carriers needed ordnance, they’d sail to meet the ship and the oilers. The Burton Method reduced the time away from being on station to two nights rather than 12 days.8
That March, when USS Franklin found itself off the coast of Japan, the logistical pipeline was firing on all cylinders. Hone writes that, in 1942, just 3 percent of carriers launched strikes on any given day. In 1945, this was up to 14%.9 (And the number of carriers had quadrupled from the early days of the war.)
Let’s return to Guadalcanal and think about Hone’s statement above that “the side that kept its forces fed…” would win. The US overcame its problems with logistics and was able to supply its forces. Meanwhile, Japan struggled to supply its soldiers on the island. Eventually, they gave up and withdrew the survivors. You cannot win a battle, or a war if you don’t have enough food, weapons, and other resources in the right place at the right time. Logistics doesn’t get the publicity that the bravery shown by front-line Marines, sailors, soldiers, and Coast Guardsmen received. But we could not have won the war against Japan had we not developed new methods of getting resources to those on the front lines.
The Japanese military, valued neither inter-service cooperation nor innovative thinking. The US triumphed because, as the Marines like to say, it was able to adapt and innovate. That triumph came about because the US Navy fostered a culture of problem-solving using”American Ingenuity.” Admiral Chester Nimitz executed on that culture seeing to it that problems were solved.
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Footnotes
- Trent Hone, From Mobile Fleet To Mobile Force: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Logistics in the Central Pacific during World War II The Journal of Military History, Vol 87 No. 2 April 2023 370
- Hone, 371
- Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (London: Penguin Books,1992) 237
- Hone, 377
- Hone, 379
- Hone, 385
- Hone, 385
- Century of Replenishment at Sea US Naval Institute,https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2018/june/century-replenishment-sea, accessed 10 July 2023
- Hone, 403
