Accurate Information Is The Lifeblood of Effective Decision-making

I first fell in love with history in the second grade. In my twenties, I became a manager in the nonprofit sector. I quickly realized that I had much to learn about leadership. It is a transferable skill, and I realized that I could combine my love of history with my growing interest in it. It wasn’t the only way I learned to be a better leader, but it was one of the most enjoyable.

This post is the first in a series discussing what we can learn from studying the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) in World War II. My target audience here is those interested in both history and improving their leadership and management skills.

Fast forward to this summer. As I researched my book on the crew of USS Franklin (CV-13), the most decorated crew in U.S. Navy history, I came across a book, The Pacific War Companion, edited by Daniel Marston. In the chapter “After Midway: Japan’s Naval Strategy 1942-1945,” historian H.P. Willmott discusses why Japan went to war with the U.S. armed with a flawed strategy. I immediately saw lessons that would apply to any profession, not just that of the military. In this post, I’ll discuss just one:

Accurate and vital information must flow unimpeded to decision-makers regardless of their location within the organization.

Professor Willmott points out that the Japanese were unable to obtain realistic reports on the damage inflicted on their enemies, and this only worsened as the war continued. Even at the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese claimed more American ships were sunk than they had in the battle. In October 1944, in the Battle off Formosa, the Japanese senior naval leaders told the Emperor they had sunk 16 American carriers (including Franklin) and more than half a million tons of shipping altogether. The Emperor called for a national celebration.¹

In another book, The Japanese Navy In World War II: In The Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers,  former Admiral Shigaru Fukodome, who commanded the Japanese naval air forces on Formosa and later in the Philippines, also agreed that, during the Battle Off Formosa, aviators’ reports were wildly exaggerated.²

In the same book, discussing the Kamikaze strategy, former Japanese naval officer Toshiyoshi Yokoi pointed out that when a kamikaze pilot sacrificed his life, his supervisor “naturally overestimated” the damage.³ Senior Japanese leaders were making decisions based on inaccurate data.

An ineffective intelligence-gathering operation also hampered Japan. In the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), mIlitary intelligence was seen as a dead-end posting, and too few personnel were assigned to it.⁴ One bright spot in their intelligence gathering was their ability to use radio direction finding (RDF) to locate US submarines. Before the Battle of the Philippine Sea, the IJN was aware that at least one US submarine was tailing Admiral Ozawa, thanks to RDF.⁵

Japan went to war knowing that the U.S. possessed a larger industrial base and a far larger population. Its leaders believed they could defeat the U.S. Navy in a decisive battle, as they had defeated Russia in 1905. Still, they failed to appreciate the importance of accurate, timely data and its role in decision-making. Their decision-making would have benefited from a more robust intelligence-gathering organization.

Clearly, accurately analyzing information by itself would not have enabled Japan to win the war. There are many more reasons why it lost. But had their government leaders been better informed, they might have realized they could not win the war and negotiated a peace earlier, saving hundreds of thousands of lives, both civilian and military.

Accurate Information Is Important In Other Professions As Well

Ignoring data is also dangerous in the modern-day business sector. Consider the tragedy of the 2023 implosion of the submersible Titan, owned by OceanGate. The submersible was designed to take tourists down to view the RMS Titanic and other ocean-floor attractions. OceanGate’s CEO ignored feedback from his employees and others who believed the submersible could not withstand the ocean depths. His unwillingness to listen to the advice of his qualified employees and to seriously consider their data led to the deaths of himself and four others.⁶

Then there is the explosion of NASA’s space shuttle Challenger, and 17 years later, the explosion of shuttle Columbia. In 1986, driven to stay on schedule, NASA leaders ignored repeated warnings from Morton Thiokol engineers about the O-rings’ ability to function in cold weather, resulting in the loss of the seven astronauts on board Challenger.

In 2003, when a chunk of foam broke off during launch and struck Columbia’s wing, some engineering teams requested additional imaging. These requests were either not escalated or were dismissed.⁷

Years before World War II, Dale Carnegie nailed it when he said, “Ninety percent of all management problems are caused by miscommunication.” The tragedy is that there are sometimes human lives in the balance.

What has history taught you that has applied to your work?

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Did you arrive here via a search engine? I am the author of the forthcoming book Heroes By The Hundreds: The Story of the USS Franklin (CV-13). In addition to writing about the bravery of the crews that saved her, I will discuss the lessons we can learn in leadership and decision-making, and the changes the US Navy made as a result.

Feel free to follow me on Facebook. There, I am M. Glenn Ross, Author. I also write a monthly newsletter, Glenn’s Action Report, about subjects I find interesting in my research. You can sign up for it below. Feel free to leave a comment or ask a question. Thanks for reading.  

-Glenn

1. H.P. Willmott, After Midway: Japanese Naval Strategy 1942-1945, in The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, ed. Daniel Marston (Osprey: Univ. Park, IL, 2005), 189
2. Admiral Shigaru Fukodome, Air Battle Off Taiwan in The Japanese Navy In World War II In The Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers, 2nd Edition, ed. by David C. Evans (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press: 1986) 352-354
3. Toshiyushi Yokoi, Kamikazes In The Okinawa Campaign, in The Japanese Navy In World War II In The Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers, 2nd Edition,_ ed. by David C. Evans (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press: 1986) 455
4. Mark Peattie, On Seas Contested: The Seven Great Navies of the Second World War, ed. by Vincent O’ Hara, David Dickson, Richard Worth(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010) 172-173
5. Minoru Nomura, Ozawa In The Pacific: A Junior Officer’s Experience in The Japanese Navy In World War II In The Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers, 319-20
6. U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Board’s Report Into the Implosion of the Submersible TITAN, 296–298
7. Boin, A. (2011). The importance of failure theories in assessing crisis management: The Columbia space shuttle disaster revisited. Policy and Society, 30(2), 77-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2011.03.003